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JURIES-PosT-TRAL QUESTIONING OF JURORS ENJOINED WHERE
FOUND A SEARCHING HOSTILE INQUIRY-CONDUCT NOT HELD
UNETHICAL. United States v. Driscoll (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Daniel J. Driscoll was convicted of willful failure to file his federal
income tax returns. Shortly after defendant's conviction, a private
investigator had telephone conversations with three of the jurors, as
well as a more extended face to face interview with a fourth. These
interviews centered on the evidence and how it had impressed the
jury. The United States Attorney sought an injunction to restrain the
defendant, his attorneys and investigators from further interviewing
jurors concerning the reasons for their verdict. The attorneys involved
indicated that the purpose of the interviews had been to determine
which evidence had influenced the jury, rather than to secure evidence
of any impropriety. They also expressed the view that, in their ex-
perience, such interviews were "common practice among trial attor-
neys."'
On hearing before the Southern District Court of New York, held,
injunction granted: The investigation was an annoyance and harass-
ment of the jurors. United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
In granting the injunction, Judge McLean discussed two inde-
pendent aspects of the problem. First, the court concerned itself with
the question of whether the requested injunction against further
interviewing of jurors should be granted. In condemning the activities
of defendant's investigator, the court concluded: (1) The jury room
should be free from outside influence, (2) such an external influence
would exist if jurors were conscious of the fact they would be subject
to interrogation as to what had occurred in the jury room, (3) this
would result in a stifling of the jurors' freedom of debate and a check-
ing of independence of thought, and (4) it is the duty of the courts
to protect jurors from the annoyance and harassment of such post-
verdict interviews.
Relying on a United States Supreme Court decision,8 the defendant
1 United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2 Id. at 237, 239. Accord, Bryson v. United States, 238 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1956),
rehearing denied, 243 F.2d 837 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957); Rakes
v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826
(1948); State v. La Fera, 42 N.J. 97, 199 A.2d 630 (1964).
8 Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); see United States ex rel. De Lucia v.
McMann, 373 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1967).
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argued that, since that court considered information of juror mis-
conduct which had been discovered after a defendant's conviction,
the lawyer should be able to interview jurors to secure such informa-
tion without impropriety. The Driscoll court, however, found the
investigation to be "a searching hostile inquiry" and held that such
conduct must be enjoined.
Next, the court addressed itself to the ethical aspects of the case,
i.e., whether the attorneys who had caused the jurors to be inter-
viewed should be disciplined. Referring to Canon 23 of the American
Bar Association's Canons of Ethics4 and pertinent opinions,5 the
court concluded the area was contradictory, confusing and ambiguous.
Therefore, the court stated that it would "give these attorneys the
benefit of the doubt and [would] not recommend disciplinary action
The Driscoll decision is in accord with the prevailing expression
of judicial disfavor and suspicion of post-trial interviewing of jurors
See also Harnsberger, Amend Canon 23 or Reverse Opinion 109, 51 A.B.A.J. 157,
158 (1965).
The propriety of post-trial interviews should be, but has not always been,
separated from the problem of whether a juror's testimony is competent to
impeach a verdict to which he has consented.
The rationale for American Bar Association Opinion 109 (1934) was couched in
terms of the policy reasons against allowing jurors to impeach their verdict. Cox-
MIT= ON PROFESSIoNA. ETHICS, OPINION 319, 53 A.B.A.J. 1127 (1967). "Formal
Opinion 109, predicated on a finding that the law prohibited a juror from testifying as
to illegalities and irregularities in reaching a verdict ... .' In the principal case, the
court relied extensively on the reasoning of Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739 (4th
Cir. 1948), which involved a motion for new trial based on affidavits of jurors as to
their misconduct; and State v. La Fera, 42 N.J. 97, 199 A.2d 630 (1964), which
involved defendant trying to impeach the verdict by showing a juror's prejudice. Thus,
it appears that whenever a question of the propriety of post-trial interviews is raised the
courts apply the same policy arguments as used when considering the problem of
receiving testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict.
4 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 23.
5 ABA Coins. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 109 (1934); ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL DECISION, No. 535 (1962); COMuITTEE
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, OPINION 285 (Sept. 28, 1933), and OPINION 767 (Jan. 14, 1952).
6 276 F. Supp. at 340.
7 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953) (court referred to such investiga-
tions as "inquisitions"); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1914) (if the
interviewing of jurors as to what occurred in the jury room were allowed, it would cause
"the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference" in jury
deliberations); Primm v. Continental Cas. Co., 143 F. Supp. 123, 127 (W.D. La.
1956) (post-trial discussions with jurors are "improper, unethical, and subject to
punishment for contempt.. ."). See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199 (9th
Cir. 1954); United States v. Nystrom, 116 P. Supp. 771 (W.D. Pa. 1953), a/fId, 237
F.2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1956); United States v. 120,000 Acres of Land, 52 F. Supp. 212
(N.D. Tex. 1943); Sindle v. 766 Ninth Ave. Corp., 127 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct.
1953); Caldwell v. Yeatman, 19 N.H. 150, 15 A.2d 252 (1940); contra, Patrick v.
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For example, the court refused to accept the attorney's explanation
that the interviewing was done for educational purposes only. Also,
in response to one juror's testimony that he did not feel the investiga-
tor had harassed him, Judge McLean stated, "[i]t is 'searching
hostile inquiry,' whether juror Martin recognized it as such or not."8
The disfavor is primarily based on the judicial belief that post-trial
interviewing of jurors threatens the efficiency of the jury system itself.
Therefore, the courts respond to these threats in terms of the public
policy to be served by protecting the jury systemY
Notwithstanding strong judicial opinion to the contrary, the Amer-
ican College of Trial Lawyers' ° and, recently, the American Bar
Association," express the belief that such interviewing, properly
conducted within certain limits, is an acceptable practice and affronts
no ethical standards. The result of the conflict in viewpoint between
the bench and bar is a decision such as Driscoll; conduct sufficiently
improper to warrant an injunction and, yet, still within the realm of
ethical behavior.
To the attorney, the practice of post-trial interviewing of jurors
serves useful and lawful purposes which fall short of any attempt
to obstruct or destroy the jury system. Studies of juror behavior may
be helpful in improving the functions of juries' 2 which would im-
Yellow Cab Co., 102 Ohio App. 312, 114 N.E.2d 735 (1953). "[Tlhere is no rule
or provision of law or public policy that prohibits the informal interrogation of a juror
after the return of the verdict."
8 276 F. Supp. at 338.
9 United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp. 771, 777 (W.D. Pa. 1953). "[TIhe court
must choose between redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the
public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to testify as to what had
happened in the jury room. I am compelled to unequivocally disapprove the practice of
interviewing a juror after a trial as to his state of mind during the trial." State v.
La Fera, 42 N.J. 97, 199 A.2d 630 (1964) (where it was reasoned that the promise
of secrecy of deliberation insures free debate in the jury room which public policy
requires); Rex v. Armstrong, [19222 2 K.B. 55, 568 (the revelation of jury delibera-
tions would diminish public confidence in the jury system). See discussion of Formal
Opinion 109, ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONA. ETHIcs, OPNIONS, No. 109 (1934).
10 AmEaicAN COLLEGE OF TRIuAL IAWYERS, CODE TRIAL CONDUCT 6 (1963).
"1 Opinion 319, 53 A.B.A.J. 1127 (1967):
Where the law governing the procedure for an action allows the testimony
of a juror by affidavit or otherwise to be used in support of or against a
motion for a motion for new trial, it is not unethical for a lawyer after trial
to talk to or question members of the jury. In states where it is not illegal, a
lawyer may communicate with jurors after the trial for the purpose of self-
education. The lawyer must not in either case harass, entice, induce or exert
improper influence on the juror.
12 Harnsberger, Amend Canon 23 or Reverse Opinion 109, 51 A.B.A.J. 157, 158
(1965): "The people and the Bar must have information regarding it [the jury system]




prove the overall judicial process of which the jury system is a part.
Also, by interviewing jurors as to their response to his presentation,
the lawyer may be able to improve his personal efficiency in future
trials. Further, the attorney may prevent a miscarriage of justice by
being sure there was no juror misconduct during the course of his
client's trial. The question is how this can be accomplished without
interviewing the jurors themselves.
Thus, the situation arises where the lawyer is pursuing seemingly
legitimate objectives that the courts are weighing against the advan-
tages which result from having a jury system with its traditional
concepts of secrecy of deliberations and freedom of debate. Yet the
only judicial guidelines given the attorney are such as were set forth
in Rakes v. United States;14
He who makes studied inquiries of jurors as to what occurred there
acts at his peril, lest he be held as acting in obstruction of the
administration of justice.15
This statement appears to express a philosophy of do it if you want
but watch out if someone complains.
ABA Formal Opinion 31916 appears to be a compromise position.
It recognizes the judicial disfavor of interviewing jurors as well as
the lawyer's needs, and attempts to limit each by the other. If the
courts will accept its dictates, Driscoll may be looked to for a factual
expansion of the type of conduct which will exceed the limits of
Opinion 319. Initially, the investigator should inform the juror that
he need not discuss the case if he does not wish to. Secondly, the
investigator should avoid mention of any previous trial of the
defendant and what the jury decided in that instance. The Driscoll
court was inclined to believe that questioning along these lines was
equivalent to an implied criticism of this jury's decision. Also, the
investigator should not argue a particular plea to the juror, lest he
be held as attempting to entice the juror to change his mind. Gener-
ally, any conduct or questioning which may give the impression that
the investigator is simply "fishing" for something with which to
impeach the verdict should be avoided. Finally, it should be kept in
13 In speaking of the absolute privilege of jurors to have kept secret their delibera-
tions, Justice Cardozo, in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1932), states that
absolute protection is "paying too high a price for the assurance to a juror of serenity of
mind."
14 169 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1948).
15 Id. at 745, 746.
16 See note 11 supra.
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mind that whether the interrogation is held to amount to harassment,
enticement or inducement will be determined on the basis of what the
usually skeptical judge thinks and not what the attorney or even the
juror feels.
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